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Abstract
Researchers have used a variety of measures to evaluate strategic alliance
performance.  In this paper we use data collected on performance of R&D consortia in the
U.S. and of Spain-based equity and non-equity dyadic alliances to investigate empirically
five basic assumptions made by strategic alliance researchers.  We find that while several
assumptions are supported, others are not.  Results are consistent across samples. We
conclude with recommendations for how to evaluate performance in future research into
strategic alliances.  
Key words: Strategic Alliance, Performance Evaluation, Equity Alliances, Consortia.TESTING ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT EVALUATING
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Introduction
The proliferation of strategic alliances over the last few decades has been accompanied
by a similar growth in strategic alliance research. As part of an effort to understand what leads
to alliance effectiveness, researchers have examined a host of factors to describe, and often to
develop normative statements about, when and how to build, develop and perhaps terminate a
strategic alliance. Typically, research examines different components of one aspect of an
alliance – e.g., partnering structure (Parkhe, 1993b), learning (Inkpen, 2002), or trust (Zaheer et
al., 1998) – and relates them to performance. Central to an understanding of the determinants of
alliance effectiveness is the type of performance measures used. What emerges from reviewing
a broad number of strategic alliance studies is that there is no single, agreed upon measure of
performance. This has led to research identifying different types of performance measures (see
for example Gray, 2000; Olk, 2002) or examining comparability between specific measures
(e.g., Ariño, 2003; Geringer, 1998; Glaister and Buckley, 1998; Geringer and Hebert, 1991), but
generally concluding that the measures used are often not equivalent. 
That researchers have not reached a consensus about strategic alliance performance
measures is not unusual. Numerous areas of strategic management research have benefited
from a periodic examination of measurement. Hoskisson et al. (1993), for example, called
attention to the similarity of an objective, entropy measure of diversification strategy to a
subjective measure. Likewise, Bergh and Fairbank (2002) examined alternative approaches to
measuring strategic change. They concluded that the most common approach may produce
flawed results, and that researchers need to recognize and address the complexities of
evaluating change in order to improve the empirical support for theory. Similarly, Nath and
Gruca (1997) examined three alternatives to measuring strategic groups, finding consistency
between archival measures with direct and with perceptual measures, but not between direct
and perceptual measures. For each of these strategic management topics, these studies reflect
an important stage in knowledge development. They consolidated findings and gave
researchers an evaluation of which measures to use and when and where measures are
appropriate. In general these studies are part of normal science, as the researchers examine
prior research for construct coherence and operationalization in their role as “validity police”
(Hirsch and Levin, 1998). For strategic alliance research, the challenge of developing
comparable measures of performance is compounded by researchers often not justifying their
measure selection. This practice results in implicit assumptions being made about
measurement development. 
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Globalization and Strategy at IESE.Our paper calls attention to these assumptions and evaluates whether they have
support. These assumptions –found in research using a variety of theoretical lenses, including
transaction cost, resource dependence, resource based view, learning, and an options approach,
and in research examining a broad array of alliance types– focus on the comparability of
various measures and respondents, the preference for select measures, and recommendations
for how to combine measures. As such, they affect the ability to achieve consistency in
findings and to develop a deeper understanding of what makes for an effective alliance. 
The contributions of our paper to an understanding of how to build effective
alliances serve as the basis for its structure. We begin by describing five assumptions
researchers have made in measuring alliance effectiveness. From these, we develop
hypotheses about relationships between different measures that permit us to test whether
there is support for the assumptions. We then test these hypotheses using data from two
different samples. The first consists of data collected from U.S. member companies of U.S.
–based research and development consortia and the second is comprised of equity and non-
equity dyadic alliances based in Spain. Testing our hypotheses using these different databases
adds to the robustness of our findings. Finally, we discuss the implications of our findings for
researchers trying to reconcile different findings related to strategic alliance effectiveness as
well as for those seeking to operationalize performance in future research. 
Assumptions about performance evaluation
The assumptions were identified from reviewing a wide variety of strategic alliance
articles and represent a range of different performance evaluation issues. These assumptions
cover issues of how best to evaluate alliance performance, as well as the relatedness of
different performance indicators. Specifically, the assumptions focus on the relationship
between continued membership and company satisfaction; on which performance criteria are
most useful; and on the evaluation of performance, in terms of relatedness among different
measures, how to combine different performance measures, and the reliability of a partner’s
evaluation for representing other partners. As noted, rarely do researchers make explicit such
an assumption –and we will note where researchers have tested or noted disagreement with
an assumption– nor do they test the impact of the assumption on research findings. In this
section we identify and discuss these assumptions and, for each, we develop hypotheses that
will allow us to test for support. 
Relationship Between Stability or Termination and Company Satisfaction
Assumption 1: Measures of stability or termination are good indicators of a company’s
overall satisfaction with, or satisfaction in achieving its strategic interests
in, the alliance.
Many researchers examining stability or termination of an alliance assume that
longevity indicates good performance and that when performance is poor, the alliance will be
terminated or restructured (e.g., Lampel and Shamsie, 2000; Marios and Abdessemed, 1996;
Meschi, 1997; Spekman et al., 1996).  Several reasons have been offered for this relationship.
First, the lack of a change reflects some degree of success in creating the arrangement, either
in terms of creating some value or in terms of conflict reduction. The alliance is likely to be
more productive when there is an absence of conflict (e.g., Steensma and Lyles, 2000). As
2Cropper (1996) noted, stability indicates an absence of opportunistic behavior, or at least the
partners have ex post safeguarded their investments in the alliance, and perhaps that
the partners have made a commitment to future persistence, continuity and continuing
viability of the relationship. 
Support for this assumption comes from a generally positive correlation found
between longevity and managerial satisfaction. Geringer and Hebert (1991), using data from
two samples, found a strong agreement between stability and company satisfaction. Drawing
from this, many researchers (e.g., Lee and Beamish, 1995) have argued that measures of
stability may reflect alliance satisfaction. 
This relationship has not always received strong support. Glaister and Buckley
(1998), attempting to replicate Geringer and Herbert (1991), found only weak support for a
positive relationship between measures of alliance survival, stability and duration, and
satisfaction measures (i.e., company’s satisfaction with alliance, company’s perception of
partner’s satisfaction, company’s perception of the alliance manager’s satisfaction, and
company’s evaluation of the costs and benefits of the alliance). In their sample, the
satisfaction measures were positively related to termination, but showed virtually no
significant relationship with stability and duration. Likewise, Hatfield et al. (1998) concluded
from their analysis that while alliance survival, duration and company satisfaction are related
indicators of performance, they reflect different phenomena and are not equivalent.
In addition to empirical reservations, several researchers have raised conceptual
concerns about the measure for representing a company’s strategic interests. One is that
termination combines natural and untimely deaths (Gulati, 1998). With a simple measure,
alliances designed for limited duration cannot be distinguished from instances where the
termination is not planned. A second is that the measure assumes stability is in the company’s
interest and tells us little about the company’s reasons for terminating (Reuer and Koza,
2000). For example, it combines situations where the company may have considered the
alliance to be performing well, but it was terminated for other reasons (e.g., the partner
decided to withdraw; the company’s strategic interests changed, making the alliance no
longer relevant even though it was performing well; or the company decided to internalize
the activities of the alliance and no longer wanted a separate entity), with situations where the
alliance was considered not to be performing well. Alternatively, Inkpen and Ross (2001)
reported evidence that some alliances persist even when the expected results are not being
achieved. Finally, Yan and Zeng (1999) argued, in addition to the above arguments, that
research on instability suffered from a static focus on stability as a destination rather than as a
process, and that it did not provide specific recommendations for management. They
concluded that instability is both a neutral concept (reflecting neither good nor poor
performance) and a dynamic one (it may be the result of many developments, and can
represent one of several different changes in the alliance). These criticisms suggest the need
to consider the strategic interests of the company when examining whether stability is related
to overall satisfaction with an alliance. 
One of the sources of these problems is that most studies have examined two-party
strategic alliances. In studying these alliances, particularly from an outsider’s perspective,
researchers cannot always distinguish between bilateral decisions leading to venture
instability and one member’s decision to depart. In addition to our data on two-party alliances
based in Spain, by including in our analysis R&D consortia, which in this study all have more
than two parties, we can evaluate when a member company departs without this leading to
alliance dissolution. Therefore, in this sample we differentiate sample venture instability from
membership change and provide a more refined test of the relationship between satisfaction
and the decision to depart than previous studies. 
3Drawing on these arguments, we propose two hypotheses to evaluate the assumption
of a positive relationship between stability or termination and company satisfaction. The first
examines the general condition of a positive relationship between the propensity to remain in
an alliance and company general satisfaction. The second refines this relationship by
considering the strategic interests of the company and evaluates whether there is a positive
relationship between propensity to remain in an alliance and satisfaction in achieving
strategic objectives. 
Hypothesis 1: Propensity of a company to stay in an alliance is positively related to
the company’s overall satisfaction with the alliance.
Hypothesis 2: Propensity of a company to stay in an alliance is positively related to
the company’s satisfaction with its strategic objectives for the alliance.
Performance Criteria Usefulness
Assumption 2: Goal-related criteria of performance are more useful than non-goal criteria,
in general, and criteria that reflect a company’s specific goals are more
useful than criteria that reflect other possible goals.
A second assumption made by many strategic alliance researchers occurs when
asking managers to evaluate the performance of the alliance against the company’s goals for
entering the alliance. Alongside termination, this is likely the most common measure of
strategic alliance performance and is what Gray (2000) refers to as a “problem-focused”
approach. The advantage of this approach is that it accesses the strategic reasons for the
company’s participation in the alliance. Directly asking managers is considered a valid
indicator of the company’s strategic intent and is said to be a better measure of success, as
defined by the decision makers, than longevity. The goals researchers have used include self-
defined goal accomplishment (Saxton, 1997), objectives met (Brockhoff and Teichert, 1995;
Lorange and Roos, 1992), and initial expectations (Geringer and Hebert, 1991), as well as
more specific goals such as learning (Lane and Lubatkin, 1998; Kale et al., 2000). 
What is not tested, in many of these studies, is whether managers find goal-related
criteria to be more important than other types of criteria. Although some researchers have
included criteria such as emergent or unintended benefits, benefits to other partners or
network externalities, or level of cooperation between the partners, there has been no testing
of whether a goal-related criterion is more useful than non-goal criteria. We test this
assumption by developing two hypotheses. In the general form of the hypothesis (H3), we
propose that all goal-related criteria are more relevant than non-goal-related criteria.
Specifically, we suggest that managers will find performance criteria that reflect motives for
partnership more useful than criteria that do not reflect possible goals. In a more specific
form of the hypothesis (H4), we propose that a company’s primary goal for partnership will
be more important in determining useful performance criteria than will other motives.
Researchers have identified a variety of reasons why a company might join an alliance (e.g.,
Contractor and Lorange, 1988). Criteria that reflect a company’s primary reason for joining
will likely be more useful to the company than criteria that reflect other motives. Stated more
formally, we anticipate that criteria that reflect a company’s primary goals will be rated more
useful to managers than criteria that reflect other goals. 
4Hypothesis 3: Performance criteria that reflect goals for alliance partnership will
be evaluated as significantly more useful than criteria that do not reflect possible
goals. 
Hypothesis 4: Performance criteria that reflect a company’s primary alliance goal
will be evaluated as significantly more useful than criteria that reflect other goals.
Performance Evaluation
Assumption 3:  Goal-related evaluations of performance are related to other evaluations of 
performance. 
Turning away from concerns about performance criteria and towards actual
performance, a third assumption can be found in the few studies that use more than one type
of measure to indicate performance. Researchers have had to make decisions about how to
analyze the different measures. Some have conducted separate analyses on each performance
indicator (e.g., Luo and Chen, 1997; Lyles and Salk, 1997). Others have combined the
different measures into a single evaluation, typically combining meeting a company’s
objectives with indicators of company satisfaction and some non-goal-related measure.
Examples of such efforts include measures of company satisfaction and joint venture
economic performance (Cullen et al., 1995; Osland and Cavusgil, 1996), and company
satisfaction, meeting company objectives and company profit (Mjoen and Tallman, 1997). 
In combining the measures, researchers assumed, but did not show evidence, that
these evaluations are related to one another and can be combined into a composite measure.
If these variables are pooled, the variables need to reflect an underlying construct of
performance, and therefore should be positively related1. This practice raises some concerns.
Researchers have argued that at times a company will have multiple and sometimes
conflicting motives for alliance partnership (e.g., Beamish and Delios, 1997). To test the
assumption that these different measures can be combined, we examine two approaches
found in the literature: combining indications of attaining strategic interests with non-goal
performance, and combining indications of attaining strategic interests with company
satisfaction. We argue that there should be a positive relationship between a company’s goal-
related performance and its non-goal performance and that there should be a positive
relationship between goal-related performance and company satisfaction.  
Hypothesis 5: Goal-related and non-goal performance evaluations of an alliance
are positively related to one another. 
Hypothesis 6: Goal-related performance evaluations and overall satisfaction with
an alliance are positively related to one another.
Assumption 4: When using multiple measures of performance, it does not matter whether
the various measures are added together or weighted for each item’s
importance.
Extending the issue raised in Assumption 3 is a concern about how to combine the
variables. When using several measures of performance, researchers have had to make
decisions about whether to add them equally or to weight them based upon the importance of
5the criterion.  For some, the measures have been added together (e.g., Steensma and Corley,
2000). For others, the indicators have been weighted based upon the criterion’s relative
importance (e.g., Parhke, 1993a). In these studies, by not directly comparing the different
approaches, there is an implicit supposition that it does not make any difference how the
variables are combined. To test this, we propose a hypothesis stating that the indication of
performance derived by adding together different indicators will not be significantly different
from the indication of performance developed from first weighting the indicators. Formally
stated, there will be a positive relationship between a composite performance evaluation
derived by simply adding together the factors and a composite performance evaluation derived
by weighting the factors. 
Hypothesis 7: Alliance performance derived by adding together non-weighted
measures will be positively related to performance derived by adding together
measures first weighted by importance.  
Assumption 5: One strategic alliance member’s evaluation of performance is significantly 
related to its partner’s performance evaluation. 
A fifth assumption one finds in the literature centers on the representativeness of a
focal company’s performance assessment for the partner’s assessment. Although some
researchers have noted that partners often have different and even competing goals for an
alliance (e.g., Hamel, 1991) and others argue that success should be evaluated in terms of
both partners’ achieving their goals (e.g., Yan and Gray, 1994), the costs and difficulties
of collecting data from more than one partner has led some researchers to argue that it is
often unfeasible to collect data from both partners when evaluating performance (e.g.,
Parkhe, 1993a). Further, Geringer and Hebert (1991) reported a strong correlation between
one partner’s assessment of an alliance and the other’s. Subsequently, a number of
researchers have assumed that partners of an alliance will evaluate performance similarly. We
test this assumption in a hypothesis that states that there will be no significant difference
among the performance evaluations made by partners in an alliance.
Hypothesis 8: There will be no significant differences in performance evaluations by
partners of the same alliance.
METHODS
We tested our hypotheses with two distinct data sets, collected without knowledge of
one another. In Study 1, we used data collected from a sample of U.S.-based R&D consortia
representing a range of industries (e.g., chemicals, energy, automotive, composite materials)
but emphasizing computers and telecommunications. These consortia were all equity
agreements around pre-competitive research activities, and involved more than two member
companies, almost all of them from the U.S. In Study 2, we worked with data gathered from
a sample of companies operating in Spain involved in strategic alliances, also from a broad
range of industries (e.g., energy, chemicals, machinery, electronic equipment, transportation),
but emphasizing financial services. The alliances were both domestic and international,
equity and non-equity agreements around competitive activities, and involved only two
partners. The general differences between the two data sets are such that consistent results
between them will enhance the robustness of our arguments.
6STUDY 1
Sample and procedures
Surveys were distributed to 110 multi-party research and development consortia
registered with the U.S. Department of Justice under the National Cooperative Research Act
of 1984, listed in the Federal Register during the period January 1985 through January 1992.
We  obtained addresses for almost all of the U.S. member organizations, representing 915
memberships in the consortia. Telephone calls made to each member organization identified
the person considered the primary liaison between the consortium and the member
organization. After the initial mailing and follow-up phone calls, we received 253 responses,
and the actual number of questionnaires usable for the purposes of this research question was
168 (18.3%), representing 77 of the 110 consortia (70%). Of these responses, 134 came from
43 consortia in which at least one other member responded. 
We tested for a non-response bias in two ways. First, we compared the respondents
to non-respondents in terms of reliably known data, including company sales, number of
employees, industry SIC code, consortium size, and number of consortia in which a company
was a member. We found no variation in terms of the industries and consortia represented,
consortium size, and number of consortia in which a company was a member. A t-test did
indicate that responding companies were slightly, yet significantly, larger than non-
respondents. Second, we compared early and late respondents across all the consortium
variables used (Armstrong and Overton, 1977), and we found that they diverged significantly
only on the age of the consortium. Early responses tended to come from members of slightly
older consortia. These analyses suggest that, while this sample appears overall to be
representative, the findings may be somewhat biased toward larger members and toward
members of older consortia.
We  also tested for the possibility of bias derived from reliance upon a single key
informant. Consistent with research on evaluating the reliability of a single informant (Kumar
et al, 1993), we examined respondents’ knowledge on multiple global indicators. First, we
examined whether there was any influence due to inadequate knowledge about the company’s
membership in the consortium. To test this, we reran the analyses using only those informants
who had been involved in the consortium for more than a year. The findings are consistent
with those we report. Second, we examined whether respondents’ position in the consortium
or the company might influence the knowledge about membership. We separated respondents
based on their self-reported position in their own company and on their affiliation with the
consortium. The positions were collapsed into upper management, middle management and
lower management. Most respondents (78%) reported coming from middle management in
their company, but held an upper management position in the consortium (81%).
Comparisons across these three levels on the variables used in this study found no significant
differences. Since neither test provides evidence of unreliability, we concluded that our
reliance upon key informants has not introduced any substantial bias to the study.
Measures
The measures used to test the hypotheses required deriving three types of variables:
membership and satisfaction variables, usefulness of performance criteria variables, and
performance evaluation. Appendix 1 provides a detailed list of the questions used to create
the variables. 
7Membership and Satisfaction Variables
Propensity to Stay. This dummy variable indicates the informants’ assessment of
their company’s intention to continue to belong to this consortium. Tests confirmed that this
measure reliably indicated subsequent consortia membership changes.
Overall Satisfaction. This variable is a 3-item, 7-point scale measuring the
informants’ assessment of the extent to which their company was satisfied with
the consortium (Cronbach’s alpha=.80). 
Usefulness of Performance Criteria Variables
Respondents were asked to evaluate 31 different criteria in terms of the usefulness of
each to their company, whether or not it was actually used, for evaluating the consortium (7-
point scale). The criteria were derived from the literatures on R&D management and on
strategic alliances (see Table 1). These 31 items were grouped into goal-related and non-goal
criteria based upon informant-supplied information on the company’s motives.  Respondents
were asked to evaluate the importance of nine potential reasons for membership in the
consortium (7-point scale). A factor analysis of the nine items revealed three factors: learning
motive, profit motive and efficiency motive. Two items did not load on to these factors and
were dropped from the analysis. The highest rated motive reported by the respondents was
considered the primary goal of the member. The various performance criteria included 10 that
reflected these three motives: five for learning, two for profit and three for efficiency. These
10 items were averaged to derive the measure Usefulness of Goal-Related Criteria.
Averaging the subset items resulted in measures of Usefulness of Learning Criteria,
Usefulness of Efficiency Criteria, and Usefulness of Profit Criteria. The 21 other criteria not
representing a company’s strategic interest in the consortium were averaged to derive the
Usefulness of Non-goal Criteria measure.
Performance Evaluation Variables
In addition to asking informants which criteria were important, we also asked
respondents their evaluation on each criterion of the performance over the previous
12 months. For subjective criteria this was a 7-point scale. For the objective evaluations (e.g.,
patents, return on investment) we asked for the actual value. In order to combine the
subjective and objective evaluations into a single composite measure, we normalized
the objective measures on a 7-point scale (i.e., lowest response became a 1 and the highest
a 7). From this we derived the following variables:
Non-Weighted Goal-Related Performance. Averaging together all the subjective and
objective evaluations of goal-related performance derived this summary indicator of
performance. This was also done for each of the goal-related performance measures: Non-
Weighted Learning Performance, Non-Weighted Profit Performance and Non-Weighted
Efficiency Performance.
Weighted Goal-Related Performance.This second summary indicator of performance
was derived by first multiplying the evaluation of the performance on a specific criterion by
the reported usefulness of the criterion. The weighted scores for the various indicators of
performance were then averaged together and then rescaled (1=lowest and 7=highest) to
develop a weighted performance indicator.  This was also done for each of the goal-related 
8Table 1. Performance Criteria
Criteria Goal Represented
by Criterion*
Percentage Changes in Consortium’s Annual Budget
Annual Percentage of Consortium Research Project Completed
Annual Number of Papers Consortium Researchers Present at Conferences or Publish
Annual Number of New Products Developed by Consortium
Annual Number of Patents From Consortium Research
Annual Number of Licensing Arrangements From Consortium Patents
Annual Profitability of Consortium – Return on Investment
Planned Versus Actual Costs of Consortium Research
Annual Number of Member Organizations Retained
Annual Number of New Member Organizations Attracted
Annual Number of Contacts Between Consortium and Your Organization  Learning
Annual Amount of Time Consortium Research Saves Your Organization Efficiency
Annual Return on Your Organization’s Investment Profit
Annual Percentage of Consortium Research Results Adopted by Your Organization Learning
Number of Spin-off Companies Created From Consortium Research
Probability of Commercial Success of Consortium Research Findings
Technical Quality of Consortium Research
External Reputation of Consortium
Responsiveness of Consortium to Your Organization’s Needs
Improvement in Consortium Researchers’ Skills and Knowledge  Learning
Consortium’s Contribution to Improvement in Skills and Knowledge of Your 
Organization’s Researchers  Learning
Consortium’s Contribution to Improvement in Your Organization’s Competitive Position Profit
Level of Cooperation Among Member Organizations
Value of Information Obtained on the Internal Research of Other Member Organizations Learning
Perceived Benefits to U.S. Competitiveness
Perceived Benefits to Member Organizations Versus Non-members
Equitable Distribution of Benefits Among Member Organizations
Planned Versus Actual Progress of Consortium Research
Planned Versus Actual Outcomes From Consortium Research
Value of Consortium Research in Comparison to Your Organization’s Internal Research
Efficiency
Value of Consortium Research In Comparison to Your Organization’s Other Cooperative 
Research Activities Efficiency
*A ll items not representing a member-level goal were categorized as other or non-goal. + Respondents saw
this list twice. The first time they rated each item in terms of how useful it was as an indicator of performance
(1=Not at all important, 7=Extremely important). The second time, they evaluated the consortium’s
performance over the previous 12 months on the item. The former responses were used to develop measures
of usefulness of performance criteria, the latter to develop measures of performance. 
9performance measures, resulting in Weighted Learning Performance, Weighted Profit
Performance and Weighted Efficiency Performance. 
Non-Goal Performance. The performance evaluations on criteria not reflecting the
goals were averaged together to create a measure of non-goal performance.
STUDY 2
Sample and procedures 
Surveys were mailed to a sample of 189 Spanish firms that appeared in Funk and
Scott’s Countries Index - Europe (1986-1992) as having announced their engagement in
collaborative activities, beginning with Spain’s adhesion to the European Community (1986)
and concluding with the establishment of the Single European Market (1992). This is a
period that can be expected, a priori, to include high venturing activity, especially if we take
into account that the international exposure of Spanish firms was low at that time. Only
alliances involving two partners were considered. 91 (48%) of the questionnaires were
returned, and they were all usable for this study. 
In order to examine potential non-response bias, we assessed possible differences in
alliances’ industries (Chi-square test) and in firm size, measured by the number of employees
(one-way ANOVA tests), between early and late respondents (Armstrong and Overton,
1977). These tests provided no indication of response bias. Examination of the variables
included in the study revealed that there were significantly more survivors among late than
early respondents (90% vs. 65%).
As an indication of the competence of key informants, over 63 percent of the
respondents had participated directly in the negotiation of the alliance in question. On
average they had been involved in the alliance for 4.9 years, with 91 percent having been
involved at least since the alliance formation, and 4.5 percent during its first year of
operation. Validity checks with secondary data suggested no evidence of unreliability2.
Preliminary versions of the questionnaire were reviewed by business scholars to ensure face
validity. The survey was then translated into Spanish and reviewed by two Spanish-speaking
researchers. The translated survey was pre-tested with six Spanish executives experienced in
managing alliances, and several changes were made after the pre-testing stage. The final
Spanish version was reverse translated into English by a person unfamiliar with the study,
and there was a high degree of correspondence between the Spanish and English versions.
For analytical purposes, we split the sample into two sub-samples. The first included
39 equity alliances, and the second 52 contractual alliances. These two types of alliances are
likely to result in diverse dynamics that have different performance implications. Thus, the
sample split allows us to assess the robustness of our results across these alliance types.
10
2 We used available secondary data for which we had the exact survey items. Specifically, we examined
whether or not the respondent firm was state-owned and whether the partner firm was a Spanish company, a
subsidiary, or a foreign company.  Matches were present for 98 and 96 percent of the cases, respectively.Measures
Appendix 2 contains the questionnaire items from which the variables were derived.
Information on performance criteria variables was not collected in this study, as it had not
been designed for this purpose initially.
Membership and satisfaction variables
Alliance Survival. This dummy variable indicates whether the alliance was still
operating at the time of data collection. 
Overall Satisfaction. This variable is a single-item, 5-point scale measuring the
informants’ assessment of the extent to which their firm was satisfied with the overall
performance of the alliance.
Partner’s Overall Satisfaction. In a similar fashion, we asked informants their
assessment of the extent to which their partner was satisfied with the overall performance of
the alliance (5-point scale).
Performance Evaluation Variables
Weighted Strategic Goal Fulfillment. This variable is a composite measure of the
importance multiplied by the degree of fulfillment of the specific strategic goals an alliance may
be meeting (Parkhe, 1993b). Importance is a 5-point scale measuring the informants’
assessment of the extent to which each of the possible goals embraced by the firm for an
alliance was important to their firm. Fulfillment is a 5-point scale measuring the informants’
assessment of the extent to which each of the identified strategic goals for the alliance was
fulfilled. A list of eight strategic goals was adapted from the literature (Contractor and Lorange,
1988; Parkhe, 1993a, 1993b). We also provided the category “not applicable” as an option.
Non-Weighted Strategic Goal Fulfillment. We summed the degree of fulfillment of
specific strategic goals an alliance may be meeting as just defined.
Partner’s Weighted Strategic Goal Fulfillment. Similarly to strategic goal
fulfillment, we constructed this composite measure by multiplying the firm’s assessments of
importance by the degree of fulfillment of the partner’s specific strategic goals an alliance
may be meeting.
Net Spillover Effects. We asked informants to assess on a 5-point scale the difference
between positive and negative effects of the alliance on other activities of their firm (Parkhe,
1993a).
RESULTS
Table 2 summarizes the expected relationships between the variables in each of the
two studies. Means, standard deviations and correlations among the variables appear in
Table 3 (Study 1) and Table 4 (Study 2).
11Table 2. Expected Relationships between Variables in Study 1 and Study 2


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































8Table 4. Means, Standard Deviations and Correlations* for Variables in Study 2
Equity SAs Sub-Sample
Correlations
Mean Std Dev. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1. Alliance Survival 0.77 0.43 100
2. Overall Satisfaction 3.49 1.12 48 100
3. Partner’s Overall Satisfaction 3.64 0.96 42 -75 100
4. Weighted Strategic Goal Fulfillment 54.54 25.99 -25 67 53 100
5. Non-Weighted Strategic Goal Fulfillment 16.85 8.06 -17 68 57 92 100
6. Weighted Partner’s Strategic Goal Fulfillment 64.05 30.21 -4 44 48 62 69 100
7. Net Spillover Effects 3.56 0.88 43 70 65 42 50 26 100





Mean Std Dev. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1. Alliance Survival 0.75 0.44 100
2. Overall Satisfaction 3.25 0.97 43 100
3. Partner’s Overall Satisfaction 3.63 0.84 31 69 100
4. Weighted Strategic Goal Fulfillment 53.58 23.87 0 42 22 100
5. Non-Weighted Strategic Goal Fulfillment     17.53 0.07 20 34 18 82 100
6. Weighted Partner’s Strategic Goal Fulfillment 55.63 27.86 15 28 24 61 64 100
7. Net Spillover Effects 3.67 0.74 35 64 53 37 34 17 100
* All correlations 28 and above are significant at the .05 level. Numbers in bold indicate results relevant for
hypotheses testing.
n=52
To test hypothesis 1, which argued that decisions regarding propensity to stay were
related to overall satisfaction, we correlated these two measures in the sample from Study 1.
The results, as can be seen in Table 3, reveal a significant and positive relationship between
these two variables (r=.27, p<.05). In the sample from Study 2 (see Table 4), we correlated
alliance survival with overall satisfaction, yielding positive and significant results both in the
equity and non-equity sub-samples (r=.48, p<.05 and .43, p<.05 respectively). Alliance
survival is also positively and significantly related to the partner’s overall satisfaction (r= .42,
p<.05 and .31, p<.05 for each sub-sample). Thus, the decision to stay in an alliance is
positively and significantly correlated with overall satisfaction, supporting hypothesis 1. 
The test for hypothesis 2 –as well as for hypotheses 3 and 4– could be done with the
sample from Study 1 only. It involved assessing the correlation between propensity to stay
and performance along each of the primary motives for partnership. These appear in Table 5.
The three separate correlations provide mixed support for the hypothesis. While efficiency
performance was significantly related to remaining in the consortium when a company’s
primary motive for being in the consortium was efficiency (r=.24, p<.05), the relationships of
15the decision to stay with learning performance (r=-.01) and profit performance (r=.54) were
not significant when the primary motives were learning and profit, respectively. It appears
that the decision to stay in an alliance represents a general satisfaction but not necessarily
satisfaction with the strategic interests in the alliance.
Table 5. Correlations for sub-samples based upon primary motives of Learning,
Efficiency and Profit, Study 1
Learning Motive Primary (n=55)
Mean Std Dev. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Propensity to Stay 1.71 0.42 100
Overall Satisfaction 4.36 1.14 34 100
Non-Weighted Learning Performance 3.90 1.07 -1 26 100
Non-Weighted Profit Performance 3.61 1.50 7 26 44 100
Non-Weighted Efficiency Performance 3.70 1.33 6 50 44 59 100
Non-goal Performance 4.25 0.78 -4 44 50 47 61 100
Usefulness of Learning Criteria 5.01 0.86 -45 -18 21 1 -1 22 100
Usefulness of Profit Criteria 5.25 1.26 -39 -21 -23 -5 -7 1 55 100
Usefulness of Efficiency Criteria 4.97 1.27 -11 -4 -10 15 26 8 26 33 100
* All correlations 27 and above are significant at the .05 level. Numbers in bold indicate results relevant for
hypotheses testing.
Efficiency Motive Primary (n=109)
Mean Std Dev. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Propensity to Stay 1.87 0.34 100
Overall Satisfaction 4.74 1.24 25 100
Non-Weighted Learning Performance 3.84 1.05 10 41 100
Non-Weighted Profit Performance 3.81 1.61 22 54 57 100
Non-Weighted Efficiency Performance 4.33 1.45 24 62 46 56 100
Non-goal Performance  4.48 0.91 9 71 45 52 52 100
Usefulness of Learning Criteria 4.89 1.00 -17 -1 26 -5 8 -8 100
Usefulness of Profit Criteria 5.54 1.13 -28 1 24 9 16 10 53 100
Usefulness of Efficiency Criteria 5.08 1.29 -16 -2 21 5 16 7 54 65 100
* All correlations 20 and above are significant at the .05 level. Numbers in bold indicate results relevant for
hypotheses testing.
Profit Motive Primary (n=5)
Mean Std Dev. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Propensity to Stay 1.75 0.50 100
Overall Satisfaction 3.83 2.06 -59 100
Non-Weighted Learning Performance 3.75 1.20 42 47 100
Non-Weighted Profit Performance 3.13 2.02 54 29 96 100
Non-Weighted Efficiency Performance 4.00 2.31 58 28 88 79 100
Non-goal Performance 4.27 1.47 -33 96 71 54 53 100
Usefulness of Learning Criteria 4.40 0.71 -94 33 -60 -63 -81 6 100
Usefulness of Profit Criteria 5.38 1.89 -57 -25 -83 -72 -99 -49 82 100
Usefulness of Efficiency Criteria 5.33 0.94 -94 31 -66 -70 -82 2 99 81 100
* All correlations 95 and above are significant at the .05 level. Numbers in bold indicate results relevant for
hypotheses testing.
16Hypothesis 3 proposed that criteria that reflect goals for why a company would be in
an alliance would be rated more useful than criteria that were not goal-related. A t-test
comparing the mean of the importance of goal-related criteria (Xmn=5.06) with non-goal
criteria (Xmn=4.67) reveals that this difference is significant (t=6.36, p<.01). The results
support the assumption that goal-related criteria are more useful than non-goal criteria. 
The fourth hypothesis refined the test of the importance of goal-related criteria by
proposing that criteria reflecting a company’s primary goal for partnership will be rated as more
useful than criteria reflecting other goals. To test this hypothesis, we compared the means for
the three “usefulness of goal criteria” variables when each of the three identified goals
(learning, efficiency, and profit) was the primary motive for joining the consortium (see Table
5).  A t-test analysis of the means for each type of motive revealed that when learning is the
highest-rated motive (n=55), learning criteria (Xmn =5.01) are not significantly different in
usefulness than efficiency criteria (Xmn =4.97, p>.05) nor profit criteria (Xmn =5.25, p>.05), and
efficiency and profit criteria are not significantly different from one another. When efficiency is
the highest-rated motive (n=109), t-test analysis revealed that efficiency criteria (Xmn =5.08) are
evaluated significantly less useful than profit criteria (Xmn =5.54, p<.05), and similarly to
learning criteria (Xmn =4.89, p>.05), while profit criteria are rated higher than learning criteria
(p<.05). In the few instances when profit is the highest-rated motive (n=5), profit criteria (Xmn
=5.38) are not rated significantly more useful than either learning (Xmn =4.40, p>.05) or
efficiency criteria (Xmn =5.33, p>.05), while efficiency criteria are significantly less useful than
learning criteria (p<.05), although these findings are likely affected by the small sample size.
These three tests do not support the hypothesis. In each instance, the criteria related to the
primary goal were not significantly more useful than other goal criteria, and for efficiency, even
lower. These findings indicate that there is not a direct relationship between the goals when
entering an alliance and the preferred criteria for evaluation3.
Hypotheses 5-8 examined managers’ evaluations of performance. For hypothesis 5,
we examined whether goal-related performance and non-goal performance are significantly
and positively related to one another. In Study 1, the results were conducted first for the
entire sample and then for each of the primary motives for membership. Each of the three
goal-related performance variables in Table 3 were significantly related to non-goal
performance [non-goal and learning performance (r=.46), non-goal and efficiency
performance (r=.51) and non-goal and profit performance (r=.55), p<.05]. Comparing the
measure of primary motive performance with the single measure of non-goal performance
indicators, in Table 5, we found a correlation of .50, or above, for each motive [non-goal and
learning performance (r=.50); non-goal and efficiency performance (r=.52); non-goal and
profit performance (r=.54)]. Because of its small size, for the profit sample the correlation is
not significant, although it is significant for each of the other two motives (p<.05). In Study
2, we correlated our measures of non-weighted strategic goal fulfillment and net spillover
effects, and found this correlation to be positive and significant (r=.50 p<.05 and .34, p<.05
for the equity and non-equity sub-samples respectively) (see Table 4). This finding provides
support for hypothesis 5, that goal-related and non-goal related performance evaluations are
positively related. In general, it appears that the assumption by researchers that these
measures are consistent with one another and may be combined appears to have support.
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3 Because of sample size limitations, we were unable to examine all the combinations where respondents
reported more than one motive above a theoretical mean suggesting importance (e.g., coding both efficiency
and learning motives greater than 4 on a scale of 1=not important, 7=very important).  Where we were able to
conduct these analyses, we found support that goal-related criteria were significantly more important than
non-goal-related criteria.  The next analysis on the performance evaluation examined whether goal-related
performance is positively related to overall satisfaction, hypothesis 6. Examining the
relationship between the overall satisfaction measure and performance for a company’s
primary motive revealed generally consistent support. As reported in Table 5, for the Study 1
sub-sample for which learning is the primary motive, learning performance is marginally
related to satisfaction measures (r=.26, p<.10). For the sub-sample where efficiency is the
primary motive, efficiency performance is related to satisfaction (r=.62, p<.05). For the sub-
sample for which profit is the primary motive, however, profit performance is not
significantly related to satisfaction (r=.29, p>.05), although we attribute this finding to the
small sub-sample size. As for Study 2, we tested this hypothesis by correlating non-weighted
strategic goal fulfillment and overall satisfaction. The results (Table 4) are positive and
significant for both the equity (r=.68, p<.05) and the non-equity (r=.34, p<.05) sub-samples.
Overall, it appears that satisfaction is associated with goal-related performance and there is
support for hypothesis 6.
Hypothesis 7 proposed that it made no difference whether a composite performance
evaluation measure was derived by adding together the unweighted individual items or
whether they were first weighted to reflect their relative importance. Results reported in
Tables 3 and 4 support the hypothesis. In Study 1, the overall simple average and the
weighted average evaluations of performance were highly related (r=.93, p<.05)4. Also, for
each of three motive-related performance measures, there was a very high correlation (r=.85
for learning, r=.78 for efficiency and r=.92 for profit) between the weighted and the
unweighted performance measures.  As for Study 2, the correlation between weighted and
non-weighted measures of strategic goal fulfillment was also positive and significant in both
sub-samples (r=.92, p<.05 and .82, p<.05 respectively). Thus, the overall results support
hypothesis 7 that such two kinds of measures would be so related5.
The final test evaluated hypothesis 8, and the assumption that one partner’s response
is similar to other partners. To test this assumption in Study 1, we conducted an analysis of
variance of the various performance measures used for those alliances in which we had more
than one respondent. The results are mixed, and appear in Table 6. While there is support for
partners in an R&D consortium having some similar evaluations of performance (e.g.,
propensity to stay, overall satisfaction, weighted learning performance and weighted profit
performance), for other measures of performance (e.g., non-weighted learning performance,
non-weighted efficiency performance, non-weighted profit performance, weighted efficiency
performance, non-goal performance, non-weighted and weighted performance), there are
differences. This suggests that measuring one company’s evaluation may not always reflect
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4 In a refined test, we eliminated low-weighted criteria from the analysis.  Including unimportant measures
would incorporate unnecessary information into the composite measure.  Consequently, we eliminated those
criteria for which the respondent did not rate above the theoretical mean (i.e., 4 on the 7-point scale).  We
multiplied the performance evaluation by the importance assigned to the criterion (5, 6 or 7) and calculated
the mean of these scores and divided by 7, to rescale the measure from 1 to 7.  This variable had a mean of
3.79 and a standard deviation of .73, and is highly correlated with both the non-weighted and the weighted
composite measures.
5 An alternative approach to evaluating the importance of weighting performance variables is to test
hypotheses 5 and 6 using weighted measures of performance.  In examining the correlations reported in
Tables 3, 4 and 5, as well as in additional analyses not reported, one finds the same relationships in 12 of the
13 correlations using weighted measures as were reported with non-weighted measures.  The one exception
was found in the sub-sample learning motives, in Study 1.  The correlation between learning performance
and satisfaction, which is marginally significant using non-weighted measures, is non-significant using
weighted measure of learning performance.  This consistency supports the finding of comparability between
weighted and non-weighted measures.  the partners’ evaluation, and that researchers will need to confirm the similar ratings. In
Study 2 we did not have data from the partner’s side. As a proxy, we used the informant’s
assessment of the partner’s performance. In this way, we ran an analysis of variance between
measures of performance of the focal firm and measures of this firm’s perceptions of its
partner’s performance. The results appear in Table 7 and show a significant difference
between the means of overall satisfaction and the partner’s overall satisfaction, as well as
between the means of strategic goal fulfillment and the partner’s strategic goal fulfillment.
These results hold for both the equity and the non-equity sub-samples in Study 2, and
–though not straight tests for hypothesis 8 that partners’ performance evaluations are similar–
are inconsistent with this hypothesis.
Table 6. Results from ANOVA of Within Alliance Consensus on Performance Evaluations, Study 1
Measures of Performance F-Score
Propensity to Stay 1.60*
Overall Satisfaction 1.77*
Non-Weighted Learning Performance 1.39
Non-Weighted Profit Performance 1.43
Non-Weighted Efficiency Performance 1.11
Weighted Learning Performance 1.70*
Weighted Profit Performance 1.53*




* Significant at p<.05
Table 7. Results from ANOVA of Within Alliance Consensus on Performance Evaluations, Study 2
Measures of Performance F-Score
Equity SAs Sub-Sample Non- Equity SAs Sub-Sample
Overall Satisfaction 12.59 *** 9.81 ***
Strategic Goal Fulfillment 3.35 + 9.84 ***
+ Significant at p<.10
*** Significant at p<.001
One of the strengths of our analysis is that we have used data from two samples and
used different measures of our constructs. While the dataset from Study 2 did not permit us to
test hypotheses 2, 3, and 4, we were able to test the remaining hypotheses. The results from
both sub-samples in Study 2 are consistent with those from Study 1, supporting hypotheses 1,
5, 6, and 7, and not supporting hypothesis 8. This consistency endorses the robustness of our
conclusions. 
19DISCUSSION
As the practice of alliances continues, evaluation of effectiveness will remain a
central issue for managers and researchers. Critical in developing knowledge of how to build
an effective alliance is an understanding of how to evaluate effectiveness. As reviews have
recognized (e.g., Gray, 2000; Olk, 2002), there is currently no single way to evaluate a
strategic alliance. In this paper we built on the few studies that have investigated
comparability of measures and provided an empirical testing of five common assumptions.
We found only two of the assumptions received complete support.
The first assumption tested was whether measures of alliance partnership continuity
are related to company satisfaction. A general version of the relationship (H1) was supported in
both samples, suggesting that the relationship is not affected by differences in the number of
partners, the activities of the alliance, or whether the alliance is equity or non-equity. A more
specific version, (H2), which considered satisfaction in achieving strategic objectives and
continuity, was not supported. Only companies engaged in the alliance primarily for efficiency
reasons had the expected positive relationship between the decision to remain and partner
satisfaction on efficiency criteria. It appears that researchers can use a company’s decision to
withdraw as an indication of its general satisfaction with an alliance but not necessarily
satisfaction with its strategic interests. This finding suggests that research might want to
distinguish between operational satisfaction and strategic objective satisfaction with an alliance.
The former may refer to satisfaction for an alliance that has acceptable levels of conflict. When
these levels are exceeded, or there is the presence of opportunistic behaviors, one may expect to
find the associated relationship of satisfaction with alliance termination (e.g., Park and Ungson,
1997). Strategic objective satisfaction, however, refers to the impact on the strategic interests of
the company. As we argued, companies may withdraw because they are satisfied, after reaching
their strategic goals for the alliance, or they may stay in because they have not yet satisfied their
strategic objectives. The determinants of each of these types of satisfaction may not be the same
and research should continue to explore their differences.  
The second assumption tested was whether managers valued goal-related measures
over other types of measures. Many researchers have evaluated alliances from a company’s
perspective, based upon whether the company achieved its goals for partnership. Using a
general form of the hypothesis (H3), we found that managers found goal-related criteria more
useful than non-goal criteria. When we examined a more specific form of the hypothesis
(H4), that managers would prefer measures that reflect their primary motive to measures that
reflect other motives, we found no support. The assumed linkage between motives and
criteria did not hold for any of the motives. While the findings for profit may be a
consequence of the small sample size, the findings for learning and efficiency reveal that
managers may use a broader array of criteria than is indicated by the motive. For example,
managers may say that they are involved primarily for learning, but also be concerned with
performance in terms of efficiency and profit. This indicates that research which measures
performance only in terms of a company’s stated or specific goals (e.g., Brockhoff and
Teichert, 1995; Lin and German, 1998; Makino and Delios, 1996) may not capture the
strategic benefits beyond the specific motives. 
We  followed this test with others that examined the assumption made by some
researchers that various evaluations of performance were distinct but related, and could be
combined. The findings from both data sets supported the assumption. We found that goal-
related performance was similar to both satisfaction measures and to non-goal performance,
and there was support for combining each of these measures with goal-related performance.
While we only considered a subset of the variables that have been used, it appears that
20researchers using multiple indicators of performance may combine performance indicators
based upon goal-related performance with satisfaction and with non-goal performance. 
An assumption on how to combine different measures was evaluated by whether the
measures should be added together or weighted based upon the criterion’s importance.
Findings from our two analyses indicated that these measures are highly related and that this
assumption was supported. Researchers may not have to worry about whether performance
measures are simply added together or first weighted before combining. Future research
should consider exploring more complex types of combinations. As noted, we used cross-
sectional data that weighted current measures. Over time, however, the importance of some
measures may change in importance, increasing the impact of weighting. For our data,
however, we found no effect. 
Our final assumption tested was whether one company’s performance evaluations
were comparable to its partner’s evaluations. Our findings suggest the relationship varied by
the measure used for sample 1 and was not supported for sample 2. Unfortunately, there is no
clear relationship between the type of performance measurement and similarity in evaluations
in sample 1. It appears, though, that researchers should not assume that one company’s
perspective extends to others. Future research might extend these findings by considering
how the level of consensus between or among companies varies by the alliance’s and the
partners’ context as well as the types of measures used. There may be situations where the
criteria of one company do in fact reflect the partner’s. Until these situations are known, we
can conclude that researchers will need to confirm one partner’s evaluation reflects another’s
for each dataset.
Although this work provides a test of these assumptions and furthers our
understanding about how to evaluate an alliance, and an important strength of our study is
that we tested most of our hypothesis with two data sets and found similar results, we
recognize that one study cannot evaluate the variety of different performance issues and that
there are limitations to it. We only collected data from one informant in each company. While
we conducted reliability checks, we were not able to examine the fairly common assumption
that these informants are reliable indicators of their company’s strategy. In addition, profit
represented only a small percentage of sample 1 company’s primary motive. In other
samples, where companies have more profit interests, the relationship between motives and
performance criteria may differ from the ones we found. Besides these suggestions, another
area in which to extend these findings is to examine predictors of performance. There is some
evidence (e.g., Erden, 1997) that even though different indicators of alliance performance are
related, they are not equivalent and have different predictors. Understanding what each
variable captures, and if or when different variables are equivalent, will help researchers
understand how findings from different studies compared. Finally, future research should
continue to explore the relationship among different types of performance measures. The
present study addressed two common assumptions found in studies using multiple measures:
evaluating whether the select measures are significantly related (#3) and if they can be added
together to create a composite score (#4). Other researchers have argued that some
performance indicators may be interim measures for subsequent measures of performance
(Hatfield  et al., 1998). For example, meeting one’s strategic objectives may precede an
overall evaluation of satisfaction. Because each of our datasets was a cross-sectional survey,
we were not able to examine temporal relationships among the measures. Exploring in the
future such relationships will add needed insights into strategic alliance evaluation.
These findings offer several specific implications for theories about strategic
alliances. First, theories that are based on specific strategic interests of the company may
21have to pay special attention to the criteria they use in evaluating performance and to
recognize that similar types of criteria may not be used for each strategic interest. For
efficiency-interested theories (e.g., transaction cost), it appears that focusing on efficiency
criteria is not adequate. Likewise for learning approaches, learning criteria do not appear to
capture adequately all the performance interests of the partner. Second, research that
examines bilateral issues –such as partner trust, negotiations, decision-making– and relates
these to performance cannot rely upon a single partner’s evaluation. Researchers will have to
collect data on both partners. Finally, there appears to be significant room for researchers to
contribute to our alliance understanding by examining multiple measures of performance,
particularly those that take a process and a dynamic perspective to alliance performance. We
know very little about these measures and there is an abundance of research that can be
conducted that will shed light on the development of an alliance.
Our research also has implications for managers. First, our finding on the relative
importance of strategic interests suggests that managers should focus on evaluating
performance against attaining the strategic reasons for participation. While this may seem
obvious, we have witnessed alliances where not all managers in the company are aware of the
strategic reasons for participation. And even if they do know the reasons for participation,
they often do not know their performance on these criteria. In the absence of this information,
we have noticed that they tend to focus on other measures, such as satisfaction or stability,
which as we found may not reflect strategic performance. Second, our finding on the
difference among partners with respect to their performance indicates that managers need to
realize that their company’s performance may not be the same as their partner’s, and to be
aware of the consequences of these differences. Again, we have witnessed alliances where
the partners were not cognizant of each other’s interests or performance in the alliance. This
lack of attention to the partner’s interests led to problems as these alliances developed.
Finally, our finding on how to combine different performance measures suggests that
managers may not need complex metrics to evaluate an alliance’s performance. Measures
that are simpler to collect, and likely simpler to understand, may provide similar evaluations. 
In summary, we set out to investigate five common assumptions found in the strategic
alliance literature. We found that while there is support for some of these assumptions, there
are areas in which strategic alliance researchers need to be careful in how they evaluate an
alliance. Building from our assessment will provide additional guidance on how to evaluate a
strategic alliance, and continuing to investigate this issue will improve the practice and theory
of how to develop an effective strategic alliance.
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25Appendix 1
Variables and questions used to derive variables, Study 1
Propensity to Stay (reverse coded)
Will your organization continue to belong to this consortium? 1=Yes, 2=No
Overall Satisfaction
Average of responses to three questions (#3 is reverse coded)
1.  Overall, how effective is this consortium? (1=not at all, 7=extremely)
2.  To what extent has this consortium met your expectations for its research and 
development activities? (1=not at all, 7=completely)
3.  If you had your way, to what extent would you change the manner in which this
consortium conducts its activities? (1=not at all, 7=completely)
Goals
How important is each of the following as a reason for your organization’s
membership in this consortium? (1=not at all, 7=very)
Learning motive was represented by the following items
– Learn about or develop a new technology
– Improve your organization’s capabilities
–T rain researchers
Profit motive was represented by the following items
– Deter entry of other organizations into this research area
– Make a profit
Efficiency motive was represented by the following items
– Share risks of uncertain research
–A void unnecessary duplication of research
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Variables and questions used to derive variables, Study 2
Alliance Survival
Is the venture still operating? 1=Yes, 0=No
Overall satisfaction / Partner’s overall satisfaction
Overall, to what extent do you think YOUR FIRM / YOUR PARTNER is satisfied
with the global results of this venture? (1=very unsatisfied, 5= very satisfied)
Strategic Goal Fulfillment / Partner’s Strategic Goal Fulfillment
Product of responses to two questions
1.  Collaborative ventures can be aimed at different strategic goals. How would you
describe the importance for YOUR FIRM / YOUR PARTNER of each of the
following strategic goals when the venture agreement WAS SIGNED? 
(1=minimal, 5= vital; 6=n.a.)
a.  Reducing costs/obtaining scale economies
b.  Gaining access to a market in the same industry
c. Gaining access to a market in another industry 
d. Developing new technologies 
e.  Blocking the competition
f. Meeting government requirements 
g. Developing new skills 
h. Reducing risks 
i. Other (specify) 
2.  How do you think each of YOUR FIRM'S / YOUR PARTNER’S strategic goals
in relation to this venture has been met?
(1=very poorly, 5= very well; 6=n.a.)
(Same list of goals as above)
Net Spillover Effects
Many collaborative ventures result in SIDE EFFECTS for their parent firms. For
example, there are POSITIVE side effects when the skills that are being developed through
the venture can be applied profitably to other operations within the company. There are
NEGATIVE side effects if the collaboration has damaging repercussions on other activities in
the company. In this venture, the NET side effects for YOUR FIRM have been: (1=strongly
negative, 5=very positive).
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